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MENTAL DISABILITY
Another "Incredible Dilemma." Psychiatric
Assistance and Self-Incrimination





Argued March 4, 1986
The Supreme Court's fascination with the impact of
mental disability on criminal law and procedure contin-
ues unabated. In recent terms, the Court has considered
such issues as the necessity of giving Miranda warnings
prior to a psychiatric competency evaluation (Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)), the admissibility of psychiat-
ric testimony on future dangerousness in response to a
hypothetical where the witness never examined the de-
fendant (Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)) and an
indigent defendant's right to psychiatric assistance
where his sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial
(Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985); Preview, 1984-
85 term, pp. 149-51).
Already this term, the Court has held that a prosecu-
tor could not use a defendant's post-Miranda silence in
an effort to rebut an insanity defense (Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 54 U.S.L.W. 4077 (1986); Preview, 1985-86
term, pp. 82-4), and has granted certiorari in cases raising
the questions of whether a defendant's mental condition
recidered a Miranda waiver ineffective (Colorado v. Con-
nelly, 3457 (1986)) and what finding of competency must
be made before the death penalty may be imposed (Ford
v. Strickland).
ISSUE
The issue in Smith v. Sielaff is one more aspect of the
same overall inquiry: when a criminal defendant facing
the death penalty seeks a pretrial psychiatric evaluation
to explore the possibility of the insanity defense or miti-
gation of punishment, can the prosecutor use incrimi-
nating statements made by the defendant to the
psychiatrist to prove the state's "case-in-aggravation" at
the sentencing phase?
Michael L. Perlin is an Associate Professor of Law and Direc-
tor of the Federal Litigation Clinic at New York Lau, School,
57 Worth Street, New York, NY 10013; telephone (212) 431-
2183.
The case also presents two other issues: 1) Assuming
that the testimony was inadmissible, whether, under
Zant v. Stephens (462 U.S. 862 (1983)), the death sentence
need not be invalidated because the error did not taint
another valid "aggravating factor" found by the jury,
and (2) Whether the case is improperly before the Court
because of "procedural default" under the doctrine of
Wainwright v. Sykes (433 U.S. 72 (1977)).
FACTS
Michael Marnell Smith was charged with raping and
murdering Audrey Weiler on May 23, 1977, in James
City County, Virginia. Smith confessed that he met
Weiler on a beach near his home, grabbed her, pulled a
knife and asked her to remove her clothes. After she
complied, he sexually assaulted her, then choked her,
dragging her into the water, submerging her head and
eventually stabbed her in the back with a knife. While
the medical examiner concluded that drowning was the
immediate cause of death, death also could have been
caused by either the stabwounds or strangulation. Fol-
lowing the attack, Smith returned home.
Two days later, police investigators came to the de-
fendant's family farm; when they confronted him with
their suspicions, Smith asked for a Bible. Smith and the
investigators then knelt and prayed before Smith gave
his confession.
Upon being appointed trial counsel (David F. Pugh)
immediately asked that Smith be examined to determine
if he were competent to stand trial; the examiner con-
cluded that he was. Because of the seriousness of the
offense and the possibility of a death sentence, Pugh
sought more comprehensive psychiatric evaluations,
and asked that Smith be committed to a state hospital for
testing, where he was examined by Dr. James Dimitris.
Dissatisfied with the hospital evaluation, Pugh asked the
trial court to appoint a private psychiatrist to evaluate
Smith, and pursuant to this order, Dr. Wendell Pile
evaluated him on October 1, 1977.
Pugh had warned Smith not to discuss the offense
with which he had been charged (or any prior offense)
with anyone other than counsel and co-counsel. While
Dr. Dimitris warned Smith that anything he said "could
be used one day against [him] in a court of law," he
nevertheless inquired about the defendant's criminal
behavior, telling Smith-it would be "helpful" if he dis-
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cussed these matters; Smith complied. Dr. Pile told
Smith nothing about either the purposes of the evalua-
tion or the uses to which the information revealed could
be put.
Specifically, Dr. Pile did not tell Smith that a copy of
his report would be sent to the prosecutor and that it
could be used against him at trial as part of the state's
affirmative case. This practice conformed with what was
then the law in Virginia (Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va.
412, 219 S.E. 2d 845 (1975) (Gibson I; but see Gibson v.
Zahradnick, 581 F. 2d 75 (4 Cir. 1979), cert. den. 439 U.S.
996 (1978) (Gibson II) holding that any affirmative use
by a prosecutor of information disclosed in a pretrial
mental evaluation so as to prove guilt was unconstitu-
tional).
In his letter to the court and counsel, Dr. Pile re-
ported that Smith told him that, thirteen years earlier
when he had been a teenager, he had "come close" to
raping a girl on a school bus that he had been driving,
but that, after he tore her clothes off, "he thought better
of it and did not do so." Smith had never been charged
with this crime; neither defense counsel nor the prose-
cutor had any knowledge of it prior to Dr. Pile's report.
Pile concluded that defendant was a "sociopathic per-
sonality; sexual deviation (rape)."
At the sentencing hearing which followed Smith's
murder conviction, Dr. Pile was called by the state and
testified about the "school bus incident," the court over-
ruling defense counsel's objection on the grounds that
the evidence was relevant and that the witness had ex-
amined the defendant at defense counsel's request. On
cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Pile for
his diagnosis. After the witness stated the diagnosis, he
further explained it in response to counsel's question-
ing: "They seem to feel no guilt, and they don't seem to
learn from either experience or punishment. They seem
to particularly have no feelings or standards of what's
right and what's wrong."
In urging the death penalty be imposed in his closing
argument, the prosecutor relied on Dr. Pile's description
of the school bus incident as well as his diagnosis of
Smith. The jury returned a death sentence, finding two
statutory aggravating circumstances: that there was a
"probability" that the defendant "would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society," and that his conduct in com-
mitting the underlying offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved
torture and aggravated battery to the victim."
On direct appeal-at which trial counsel did not as-
sign the admission of Pile's testimony as error-the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court affirmed (219 Va. 455, 248 S.E. 2d
135 (1978)). After trial ,,riefs had been submitted but
prior to oral argument before the Virginia Supreme
Court, the Fourth Circuit decided Gibson II.
On state habeas (alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel), appellate counsel called Pugh to testify; Pugh
stated that he did not assign Dr. Pile's testimony as error
because he thought the claim was without merit under
Virginia law. He admitted that he had not personally
researched the question of the claim's possible merit
under federal law, and did not know the extent of re-
search his student assistant had performed on the issue.
The trial court found that the claim was forfeited on the
grounds of "procedural default" under Sykes, rejecting
Smith's claim that trial counsel's failure to raise the issue
on appeal was due to "ignorance or neglect" rather than
"informed professional deliberation."
Defendant's collateral habeas attack was dismissed by
the district court, and that dismissal was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit, which addressed the question of Dr.
Pile's testimony without explicitly dealing with the issue
of procedural default; although the circuit assumed
without deciding that Dr. Pile's testimony was inadmissi-
ble, and that it tainted the jury's finding of future dan-
gerousness, it ruled that the death sentence was still
valid because the testimony did not taint the jury's other
finding (an offense "outrageously or wantonly vile, hor-
rible or inhuman"). The court of appeals interpreted
Zant to permit a death sentence to stand as long as it is
predicated on one valid aggravating circumstance (769 F.
2d 170 (4th Cir. 1985)).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The questions raised in this case draw sharply into
focus one of the persistent problems of criminal proce-
dure: can a defendant be forced to give up one right (in
this case, the privilege against self-incrimination) to
exercise another right (here, clinical evaluation and assis-
tance by a trained mental health professional)? Coming
so soon after the Ake decision, which entitled a de-
fendant to such expert help in both evaluative and con-
sultative functions, Smith will likely signal whether the
Supreme Court sees this problem as another truly "in-
credible dilemma" after all. (See Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957) (finding it "intolerable" to
force the defendant to abandon a Fourth Amendment
right to assert an independent Fifth Amendment guar.
antee."
Smith relies extensively on last term's decision in Ake,
which characterizes the psychiatric evaluation as often
being "crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal a
defense," noting that the exam will be reliable only if it
can be a "full and probing inquiry into the circumstances
of the offense and the defendant's previous behavioral
history." He reads Ake in close juxtaposition with Estelle,
which held that a "neutral" pretrial competency evalua-
tion cannot be transformed into a proceeding enabling
the prosecution to meet its burden of proving statutory
aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase-a prac-
tice which would implicate a defendant's interest, in the
Estelle court's words, in not being the "deluded instru-
ment of his own execution."
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It is fundamentally unfair, Smith argues, to put a
defendant to a Hobson's Choice-forced to choose be-
tween the right to a clinical evaluation (guaranteed by
Ake) and the privilege against self-incrimination (man-
dated by Estelle)-a position that has been endorsed by at
least five circuits, and which is consonant with the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards, the Model Penal Code and
the opinions of many commentators. Although these
cases have dealt with findings of guilt, they similarly
apply to the penalty phase of death cases. Also, while
Smith asked that Dr. Pile be assigned to evaluate him,
under Estelle, witness's role changed and "became essen-
tially like that of an agent of the state."
In an analogous area, those courts- that have upheld
the constitutionality of compulsory psychiatric evalua-
tions for defendants who wish to plead not guilty by
reason of insanity have, almost without exception, re-
duced the potential impact on the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination by holding that the state can-
not use any of defendant's disclosures at such an evalua-
tion on the question of guilt, but merely to rebut claims
raised by defendant as to mental condition.
Further, Smith suggests that the Virginia practice is
aberrational; in at least thirty-eight states, either
through casela*w court rule or statute, the affirmative
prosecutorial use of disclosures made by a defendant
through a defense-requested mental evaluation is pro-
hibited. Even Virginia has amended its statutes so as,
apparently, to prevent introducing into evidence a
statement made by defendant during a pretrial evalua-
tion about the offense, unless the defendant raises the
issue of lack of responsibility.
Finally, Smith argues that the Fourth Circuit, in a
"breathtaking" error, both misread and misapplied the
Zant doctrine, and that the constitutional defect repre-
sented by admitting Dr. Pile's testimony cannot be ig-
nored.
On the other hand, the state focuses initially on the
procedural default issue, urging the Court to bar
substantive consideration of Smith claim under Sykes.
Ori the merits, it construes Dr. Pile's testimony as "insig-
nificant" and suggests that Estelle is distinguishable be-
cause Pile was chosen to evaluate the defendant
specifically by defense counsel. It concludes that, even if
Pile's testimony was inadmissible, the death sentence
should stand under Zant because there was ample ind-
pendent basis for a "vileness" finding by thejury.
The Court has not ruled consistently that defendants
cannot be penalized when they are faced with an "in-
credible dilemma." What is most intriguing about this
case, however, is that the two rights in question-the
"Ake right" and the "Estelle right"-were, until the
Court's recent Greenfield decision, articulated in the only
cases in which mentally disabled criminal defendants
have prevailed in the Supreme Court in recent terms.
The Court remains drawn to cases involving all as-
pects of the impact of mental disability on criminal pro-
secution. Its decision in Ake reflected a significant
sensitivity to the value of psychiatric examinations, both
for purposes of trial strategy and for evaluative reasons.
In many ways, the key question in the case before it is
whether the careful and sensitive psychiatric evaluation
and assistance envisioned by the Ake majority can be
reconciled with the permissible use of testimony such as
Dr. Pile's.
ARGUMENTS
For Michael Marnell Smith (Counsel of RecordJ. Lloyd Snook,
III, 230 Court Square, Charlottesville, VA 22901; telephone
(804)293-8185)
1. Dr. Pile's testimony was constitutionally inadmissable;
defendants cannot be forced to choose between the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
an adequate mental evaluation; the principle that the
state cannot affirmatively use'evidence from a pre-
trial mental evaluation to prove guilt also applies to
the penalty phase of a death case; the identity of the
party that requested the examination is not relevant
for purposes of the constitutional determination.
2. The testimony in question was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
3. Nothing in Zant suggests that a prejudicial defect in
sentencing should be ignored because there is an
additional untainted statutory predicate.
For Allyn R. Sielaff (Counsel of Record, James E. Kulp,
Supreme Court Building, 101 N. 8th Street, Richmond, VA
23219; telephone (804) 786-6565)
1. Smith's claim is barred under the procedural default
rule of Sykes.
2. The evidence in question was admissible; in addition,
it was insignificant, and did not influence the jury's
decision to impose a death sentence.
3. The court of appeals properly applied Zant.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Michael Marnell Smith
A brief by the New Jersey Department of the Public
Advocate's Division of Mental Health advocacy describes
in depth the latitude given to defendants in New Jersey
to fully explore and develop psychiatric defenses with-
out impeding the reasonable aims of law enforcement. A
joint brief by the American Academy of Psychiatry and
Law (the professional association of forensic psychia-
trists) and American Psychiatric Association argues that
the psychiatric function envisioned in Ake also precludes
prosecution access to psychiatrists consulted by the de-
fense but not called as witnesses. A brief by the Ameri-
can Psychological Association asked the Court to clarify
that its rulings in this area are meant to apply to psychol-
ogists and other "appropriately trained mental health
professionals" as well.
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